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NOTE
A FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO CORRUPT
YOUR POLITICIAN
Eugene Temchenko†
     Are you dealing with state or federal agencies, to no avail? 
Do you need someone on top to advocate for you?  You may 
have a right to buy your Governor’s help.  It is well-
established that the Constitution protects the right of 
political association, which includes contributions to 
candidates in return for ingra-tiation and access. 
Nonetheless, courts and scholars have generally limited 
this right to contributions to campaigns for public office. 
After McDonnell v. United States, that may change. 
Reading the McDonnell opinion in light of McCutch-eon, this 
Note and other commentators conclude that the Su-preme 
Court may have inadvertently created a First 
Amendment right to buy a politician’s influence, favor, and 
advocacy even outside the campaign finance setting.  Un-
doubtedly, to the general public this must appear as nothing 
other than a First Amendment right to bribery.  Yet this right 
has already been articulated in courts and has the support of 
at least one U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals judge.  These find-
ings suggest that Congress may no longer be able to criminal-
ize certain types of corruption.  Some courts have begun to 
reverse convictions and invalidate parts of existing anti-cor-
ruption statutes.  While the impact of the First Amendment 
right remains unclear, the dismantling of the United States’ 
anti-corruption framework may already have begun.
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INTRODUCTION
To protect speech, the Court forsakes integrity in govern-
ment.  This has been the trend in campaign finance cases,
beginning with Buckley v. Valeo1 and becoming notorious in
Citizens United2: laws that shield us from corruption concede
to the First Amendment right of political association.3  Can an
incumbent demand that her constituents pay tribute in return
for having their concerns heard?  Can a company purchase the
advocacy of an incumbent?  Thus far, scholars have asserted
that Citizens United applies only in the campaign context, such
that the First Amendment protects campaign financing but not
bribery or extortion.4  After McDonnell v. United States,5 how-
1 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
2 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
3 For discussion of case law on campaign financing, see Jon Ellingson, How
the Court Got It Wrong and Jeopardized Our Democracy, MONT. LAW., May 2016, at
10, 22–23.
4 See, e.g., Nicholas Almendares & Catherine Hafer, Beyond Citizens United,
84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2755, 2777 (2016) (arguing that “Citizens United’s use of
‘corruption’ is very much a term of art” that is applicable only in campaign finance
cases).
5 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-2\CRN205.txt unknown Seq: 3 15-JAN-18 14:07
2018] A RIGHT TO CORRUPT 467
ever, Citizens United may have force outside the campaign-
financing context—there may be a constitutional right to cor-
rupt your politician.
In McDonnell, the Supreme Court attempted to draw the
line between criminal corruption and permissible constituent
service.6  The case involved the Governor of Virginia who, in
exchange for hundreds of thousands of dollars’ worth of gifts
and loans, used his position as the governor to champion a
dietary supplement.7  The jury found the Governor guilty of
taking a bribe8 under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, but the
Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that sale of
influence alone was not punishable.9
This holding prompted varying responses.  Some asserted
that the Court’s holding “opens the door to a corrupt ‘pay to
play’ culture” and the “selling [of] office for personal gain.”10
Others asserted that the Court simply rejected “novel prosecu-
tion theories that convert traditional constituent services into
federal crimes.”11  Still others find significant the question Mc-
Donnell briefed but the Court did not address: Did the First
Amendment protect McDonnell’s sale of influence, favor, and
access?12  Questions thus abound in McDonnell: Why did the
Court permit such abuse of public office?  Does the Court’s
holding legalize a form of corruption?  Is there a First Amend-
ment right to corrupt your politician?  This Note will address
these questions.
6 See Tara Malloy, Symposium: Is It Bribery or “the Basic Compact Underlying
Representative Government”?, SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2016, 4:03 PM), http://
www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-is-it-bribery-or-the-basic-compact-
underlying-representative-government/ [http://perma.cc/U63V-A6MK].
7 United States v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478, 488–93 (4th Cir. 2015).
8 Although the text of the Hobbs Act criminalizes the “obtaining of property
from another, with his consent . . . under color of official right,” 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951(b)(2) (2012), courts treat this crime as “the rough equivalent of . . . ‘taking
a bribe.’”  Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 260 (1992); see also Ocasio v.
United States, 136 S. Ct. 1423, 1428 (2016).
9 See McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2365, 2372.
10 Fred Wertheimer, Symposium: McDonnell Decision Substantially Weakens
the Government’s Ability to Prevent Corruption and Protect Citizens, SCOTUSBLOG
(June 28, 2016, 12:38 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-
mcdonnell-decision-substantially-weakens-the-governments-bbility-to-prevent-
corruption-and-protect-citizens/ [http://perma.cc/U42Q-LSWX].
11 Jeffrey Green & Ivan Dominguez, Symposium: Federal Criminal Statutes
Are Not Blank Checks for Prosecutors, SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2016, 11:44 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-federal-criminal-statutes-
are-not-blank-checks-for-prosecutors/ [http://perma.cc/QD6W-TNHX] (assert-
ing that the Supreme Court in McDonnell merely prevented prosecutor overreach).
12 See Malloy, supra note 6. R
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As a preliminary matter, however, one ought to consider
whether we should be concerned about the selling of influence,
favor, and advocacy at all.  Most would characterize such sales
as corruption.13  Yet some empirical studies suggest corruption
is neither prevalent in, nor harmful to, the United States.14
One ought to reject this conclusion for two reasons.  First, po-
litical scientists have long cautioned that corruption can trans-
form a representative democracy into a tyranny.15  Congress
appreciated this threat and so enacted statutes to prevent cor-
ruption of public office.16  In fact, a number of studies substan-
tiate these fears, finding significant and detrimental effect of
money on politics.17  Second, corruption harms public trust in
government.18  As of 2015, 75% of Americans perceived corrup-
tion as widespread on Capitol Hill.19  This distrust in the U.S.
political system was also evident in the 2016 election.20  Ac-
13 See, e.g., Telink, Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 42, 43 (9th Cir. 1994)
(noting that the prosecution listed “influence peddling” among allegedly corrupt
acts); Seropian v. Forman, 652 So. 2d 490, 502 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (Stone,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Accusing a government official of
influence peddling is arguably the equivalent of a charge of corruption.”).
14 Cf. Stephen Ansolabehere, John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder Jr.,
Why Is There So Little Money in U.S. Politics?, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 105, 127 (2003)
(suggesting that private interest group money plays an insignificant role in influ-
encing U.S. politicians); Paolo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 Q.J. ECON. 681,
681 (1995) (listing studies that “suggest[ ] that corruption might raise economic
growth”).
15 See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, POLITICS (C. 350 B.C.E.), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE
WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1986, 2068 (Jonathan Barnes, ed. 2014) (“When the magis-
trates are insolent and grasping they conspire against one another and also
against the constitution from which they derive their power, making their gains
either at the expense of individuals or of the public.”); accord BERNARD BAILYN, THE
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 56, 79, 105, 139–40 (Vintage, 1970) (noting that the
founding fathers saw corruption as a threat to liberty).
16 See CONG. GLOBE, 32d Cong., 2d Sess. 242 (1853) (explaining that 10 Stat.
170 was enacted to preserve the honor of offices and the “character of the
Government”).
17 Cf. Michael M. Franz, Addressing Conservatives and (Mis)using Social Sci-
ence in the Debate over Campaign Finance, 51 TULSA L. REV. 359, 369 (2016)
(listing the findings of various studies and noting that these studies tend to
disagree on whether money actually influences politics).
18 Eric M. Uslaner, Political Trust, Corruption, and Inequality, in HANDBOOK ON
POLITICAL TRUST 302, 304, 307 (Sonja Zmerli & Tom W.G. van der Meer eds., 2017);
see also Jacobus v. Alaska, 338 F.3d 1095, 1113 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Like direct
influence-peddling by candidates, this kind of access-peddling creates a danger of
corruption and the appearance of corruption.”).
19 75% in U.S. See Widespread Government Corruption, GALLUP (Sept. 19,
2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/185759/widespread-government-corrup
tion.aspx [http://perma.cc/KMJ5-7F55].
20 See Trump Blasts Clinton for ‘Pay-for-Play Corruption,’ BLOOMBERG (Nov. 3,
2016, 1:44 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/videos/2016-11-03/
trump-blasts-clinton-for-pay-for-play-corruption [http://perma.cc/686E-ACDY];
see also Francesca Chambers, FBI Clinton Foundation Probe Finds ‘Avalanche’ of
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cordingly, we must not delay in addressing corruption—its
problems are present and immediate.21
Being concerned with corruption does not mean, however,
that we ought to conduct a witch-hunt to root out every ap-
pearance of corruption.  Whereas under-regulation can cause
social discord,22 overzealous regulation can freeze the govern-
ment and harm the economy.23  State and federal governments
must neither over-regulate nor under-regulate.  This Note will
not, however, attempt to determine the optimal level of regula-
tion or expound on the dangers of corruption.24  It suffices to
say that our anti-corruption laws must be carefully studied
and discussed.25  Rather, this Note focuses on the interaction
between the U.S. anti-corruption framework and Constitu-
tional Law.  Specifically, this Note investigates whether recent
Supreme Court cases created a constitutional right to engage
in some form of corruption.
Part I of the Note focuses on the Supreme Court’s most
recent bribery case—McDonnell v. United States.  The Note
summarizes the prosecution of Governor McDonnell, beginning
with a review of the facts and the relevant lower courts’ hold-
ings, then looks at the Supreme Court’s decision.  The Note
finds no flaw with the Court’s reasoning and concludes that the
bribery statute never covered the sale of influence, favor, or
advocacy.  Nonetheless, the Note asserts that the McDonnell
holding complicates future bribery prosecutions by imposing
additional mens rea requirements.
Corruption Evidence Against Her - but Agents Fear Justice Department Will Stop
Her Going on Trial, DAILYMAIL (Nov. 3, 2016, 8:52 AM), http://www.daily
mail.co.uk/news/article-3901376/Secret-recordings-fueled-FBI-s-desire-probe-
Clinton-Foundation-case-moves-likely-indictment.html [http://perma.cc/EGG9-
KCYU].
21 CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 173
(Thomas Nugent trans., D. Appleton & Co. 1900) (“When once a republic is cor-
rupted, there is no possibility of remedying any of the growing evils but by remov-
ing the corruption and restoring its lost principles.”).
22 See Sarah Dix, Karen Hussmann & Grant Walton, Risks of Corruption to
State Legitimacy and Stability in Fragile Situations, 2012 U4 ISSUE 1, 6 (2012).
23 See Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, Why Do Some Countries Produce So
Much More Output per Worker than Others?, 114 Q.J. ECON. 83, 84 (1999).
24 For a discussion of these topics, see Rick Hubbard, Restoring Citizen Repre-
sentation in Our Democratic Republic: Congress Is Lagging—Do We Have the Will to
Force Change?, 40 VT. B.J. 20 (2014).
25 Cf. JOHN ADAMS, A DISSERTATION ON THE CANON AND FEUDAL LAW (1765), re-
printed in 3 CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 447, 457 (Charles
C. Little & James Brown eds., 1851) (extolling the virtues of the press and dis-
course as shields against “the ambition or avarice of any great man” and “the jaws
of power”).
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In Part II, the Note explores the question of whether the
Governor engaged in any corruption at all.  Here, the Note finds
that the McDonnell Court adopted a definition of corruption
identical to that established in Citizens United and McCutch-
eon.  Under this definition, the Governor was not corrupt.  The
Note contends that this definition may extend First Amend-
ment protection to the sale of political influence and favor,
“rules-free policymaking and electioneering.”26
Finally, Part III of the Note explores whether the First
Amendment can be used as a defense to bribery or other cor-
ruption charges.  The Note finds that such use of the First
Amendment is possible, but that doctrines developed in the
U.S. Courts of Appeals decrease the likelihood of success.
Thus, the Note concludes that it may be your constitutional
right to pay for your governor’s influence, favor, and advocacy.
Just make sure you are prepared to fight to the Supreme
Court.
I
MCDONNELL V. UNITED STATES: SUPREME COURT DEFINES THE
BRIBERY STATUTE’S “OFFICIAL ACT” REQUIREMENT
Prosecutors often charge officials with violations of the
Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, or with honest services fraud, 18
U.S.C. § 1346, by establishing bribery, as defined in 18 U.S.C.
§ 201.27  To establish bribery, the government must prove that
(i) something of value was offered to or received by (ii) an in-
cumbent official or a candidate for office, with the (iii) intent to
either “influence any official act” or “be[ ] influenced in the per-
formance of any official act.”28  Yet the Supreme Court’s gui-
dance on this statute is somewhat lacking.  The Court has not
addressed the bribery statute since 1999, when in United
States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California the Court required
26 Brent Ferguson, Does the First Amendment Justify Corruption?, AM. PROS-
PECT (Apr. 26, 2016), http://prospect.org/article/does-first-amendment-justify-
corruption [http://perma.cc/3F2V-D4Y9] (expressing the fear that the McDonnell
Court will establish a First Amendment right to some forms of corruption).
27 See, e.g., United States v. Ring, 706 F.3d 460, 465 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (charg-
ing defendant on a bribery theory of honest-services fraud); United States v. Gaw,
2014 WL 2435269, at *2 (D. Mass. May 30, 2014) (charging the same).  The
Supreme Court permitted such use of the honest services fraud statute and the
Hobbs Act. See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 408–09 (2010) (honest
services fraud covers bribery); Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 269 (1992)
(Hobbs Act encompasses bribery); see also Stephanie E. Lapidus & Mariya
Mogilevich, Public Corruption, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 915, 921, 930 n.117 (2010)
(outlining the elements of criminal bribery).
28 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2012).
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the prosecution to prove a quid pro quo—that something of
value was given in exchange for an official act.29  The Court did
not, however, address what constitutes an “official act,” and
this ambiguity became the primary issue in McDonnell v.
United States.30
A. The Governor of Virginia Sells Special Treatment for a
Rolex
Robert F. McDonnell, the seventy-first Governor of Virginia
(“McDonnell”), was living beyond his means: at the time of his
inauguration in 2010, he and his wife, Maureen McDonnell
(“Maureen”), owed over ninety thousand dollars in credit card
debt; his real-estate business was losing money, and, by 2012,
his business owed nearly two-and-a-half million dollars.31  In
the depths of economic despair, McDonnell ran into Jonnie
Williams, the founder and chief executive of Star Scientific,
Inc.32  McDonnell had met Williams once before—in 2009,
before his inauguration as governor, when they shared a five-
thousand-dollar bottle of cognac and discussed an expensive
dress Maureen was to wear to the inauguration.33  Their sec-
ond meeting was on a six-hour flight from California to Vir-
ginia, and Williams spent the flight “extoll[ing] the virtues of
Anatabloc,” a product he created to treat chronic inflamma-
tion.34  By the end of the flight, McDonnell agreed to introduce
Williams to Virginia’s secretary of health and human
resources.35
Thereafter, the McDonnells’ interaction with Williams be-
came increasingly venal.  After Maureen seated Williams next
to McDonnell at a political rally, Williams took Maureen on a
shopping spree, spending approximately twenty thousand dol-
lars in a single day.36  In May of 2011, Williams loaned sixty-
five thousand dollars to the McDonnells to help their financial
crisis, and funded McDonnell’s golfing trip with his two sons,
covering a $2,380.24 bill.37  Then over the summer of 2011,
Williams presented the McDonnells with various gifts, includ-
29 See 526 U.S. 398, 404–06 (1999).
30 See United States v. McDonnell, 64 F. Supp. 3d 783, 788 (E.D. Va. 2014),
aff’d, 792 F.3d 478, 506 (4th Cir. 2015), rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2359–60 (2016).
31 See United States v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478, 486–90 (4th Cir. 2015).
32 See id. at 487.
33 See id.
34 Id.
35 See id.
36 See id. at 487–88.
37 See id. at 488–89.
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ing a vacation at Williams’s multimillion-dollar home, a boat
rental, use of Williams’s Ferrari and Range Rover, a Rolex
watch, and new golf clubs and bags.38
During the same time period, Maureen purchased over six
thousand shares of Star Scientific, Inc.39  McDonnell directed
his staff to meet Williams to discuss Anatabloc clinical trials at
Virginia’s public institutions, while Maureen met members of
those institutions to notify them of how important Anatabloc
was to McDonnell.40  McDonnell also hosted luncheons funded
with his PAC, where he publicly advocated for Anatabloc.41
Allegedly, McDonnell’s influence was necessary to induce the
Commonwealth of Virginia to fund the Anatabloc research.42
This relationship continued for four years, purposefully
hidden from the public: Williams later testified that he “didn’t
want anyone to know that [he] was helping [McDonnell] finan-
cially with his problems while [McDonnell] was helping [Wil-
liams’s] company.”43  Similarly, McDonnell “did not tell his staff
about the personal benefits he received from Williams,” and his
“public financial disclosure[s] . . . omitted most of them.”44
Thus, the Governor of Virginia used his influence and position
to promote a private product in exchange for expensive gifts.
B. The Jury Believes the Sale Is Corrupt and Criminal
When these transactions went public, the U.S. Govern-
ment charged McDonnell “with honest-services fraud, Hobbs
Act extortion, and conspiracy to commit those offenses.”45  The
government sought to convict McDonnell by showing that he
had taken a bribe.46  This, in turn, required the prosecution to
establish that McDonnell performed an “official act,” which the
38 See id. at 489–90.
39 See id.
40 See id. at 490.
41 See id.
42 See Indictment at ¶¶ 12, 44, United States v. McDonnell, 64 F. Supp. 3d
783 (E.D. Va. 2014) (No. CR 14-00012) (noting that Star Scientific used Robert to
solicit research funding); Arthur Allen, The Real Scandal in Virginia, SLATE (Jan.
29, 2014, 11:49 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/medi
cal_examiner/2014/01/virginia_gov_bob_mcdonnell_scandal_star_scientific_in_
trouble_with_fda_over.html [http://perma.cc/RZ3U-UCSR] (noting that Star Sci-
entific could not afford research on its own).
43 McDonnell, 792 F.3d at 491.
44 Brief of Respondent at 10–11, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355
(2016) (No. 15-474).
45 Id. at 11.
46 See McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2365 (2016) (“The theory
underlying both the honest services fraud and Hobbs Act extortion charges was
that Governor McDonnell had accepted bribes from Williams.”).
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parties agreed to define pursuant to the Federal Bribery Stat-
ute, 18 U.S.C. § 201 as:
[A]ny decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit,
proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pend-
ing, or which may by law be brought before any public offi-
cial, in such official’s official capacity, or in such official’s
place of trust or profit.47
Following a five-week trial, the jury found McDonnell guilty.48
McDonnell filed a motion to vacate the jury verdict and a mo-
tion for a new trial, but the district court denied both
motions.49
McDonnell appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, arguing that the following jury instruction on
the meaning of “official act” was erroneous50:
The term official action . . . includes those actions that have
been clearly established by settled practice as part of a public
official’s position, even if the action was not taken pursuant
to responsibilities explicitly assigned by law.  In other words,
official actions may include acts that a public official custom-
arily performs, even if those actions are not described in any
law, rule, or job description.  And a public official need not
have actual or final authority over the end result sought by a
bribe payor so long as the alleged bribe payor reasonably
believes that the public official had influence, power or au-
thority over a means to the end sought by the bribe payor.  In
addition, official action can include actions taken in further-
ance of longer-term goals, and an official action is no less
official because it is one in a series of steps to exercise influ-
ence or achieve an end.51
The Court of Appeals found these instructions proper, despite
McDonnell’s argument that the instructions encompassed cer-
emonial acts such as receptions and speeches.52  The Court of
47 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3) (2012); McDonnell, 792 F.3d at 505.
48 See McDonnell, 792 F.3d at 486.
49 See United States v. McDonnell, 64 F. Supp. 3d 783, 802 (E.D. Va. 2014)
(denying the first motion); United States v. McDonnell, 2014 WL 6772486, at *8
(E.D. Va. Dec. 1, 2014) (denying the second motion).
50 See McDonnell, 792 F.3d at 494.  The Governor also raised several procedu-
ral and substantive arguments, which the Court of Appeals dismissed. Id. at 486.
This Note will not address these challenges.
51 Id. at 505–06.
52 See id. at 506–08 (citing United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal.,
526 U.S. 398 (1999); United States v. Birdsall, 233 U.S. 223 (1914)) (noting that
the district court’s instructions were not overbroad and conformed to Supreme
Court precedent).
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Appeals also upheld the district court’s decision to reject Mc-
Donnell’s proposed instructions.53
The Court of Appeals then reviewed the evidence submitted
to the jury and concluded that it was sufficient to sustain a
conviction.  The Court of Appeals first identified three official
acts McDonnell performed.  First, McDonnell “exploited the
power of his office in furtherance of an ongoing effort to influ-
ence . . . state university researchers” to study Anatabloc.54
Second, McDonnell used his influence to urge “the state-cre-
ated Tobacco Indemnification and Community Revitalization
Commission . . . [to] allocate money for the study of
anatabine”—the basis of Anatabloc.55  And third, McDonnell
used his influence to urge health department officials to “in-
clude Anatabloc as a covered drug” in the health insurance
plan for state employees.56  For each of these acts—the quo—
the Court of Appeals found a contribution of money or service—
the quid.57  Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that McDon-
nell “received a fair trial and was duly convicted by a jury of his
fellow Virginians.”58  Thereafter, McDonnell petitioned the Su-
preme Court for a writ of certiorari, which the Court granted
but limited to the question of whether McDonnell performed an
official act.59
C. The Supreme Court Disagrees
The Supreme Court began its review by noting that Mc-
Donnell’s Hobbs Act and honest services fraud convictions de-
pended wholly on the district court’s interpretation of “official
act.”60  The Government contended that an official act “encom-
passes nearly any activity by a public official . . . includ[ing]
arranging a meeting, contacting another public official, or host-
ing an event—without more—concerning any subject, includ-
ing a broad policy issue.”61  Speaking on behalf of a unanimous
court, Chief Justice John Roberts rejected such an interpreta-
tion, holding that “setting up a meeting, calling another public
official, or hosting an event does not, standing alone, qualify as
53 See id. at 513 (noting the Governor’s proposed instructions that “ ‘[m]any
settled practices of government officials are not official acts’ . . . [was] not a
statement of law . . . [but] a thinly veiled attempt to argue the defense’s case”).
54 Id. at 517.
55 Id. at 516.
56 Id.
57 See id. at 518–20.
58 Id. at 520.
59 See McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 891, 891 (2016) (mem.).
60 See McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2365, 2367 (2016).
61 Id. at 2367.
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an ‘official act.’”62  In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme
Court developed a two-part test to determine whether a public
official acted officially.  First, did the public official’s conduct
constitute a “formal exercise of governmental power”?63  Sec-
ond, did the public official decide a matter that by law is the
official’s duty to decide, or intentionally influence another offi-
cial to decide such a matter?64
According to Chief Justice Roberts, an official act denotes
“a formal exercise of governmental power” because 18 U.S.C.
§ 201 requires an action on a “question, matter, cause, suit,
proceeding or controversy”—terms traditionally used to refer to
“lawsuit[s], hearing[s], and administrative determination[s].”65
Moreover, the statute also requires “that the question or matter
. . . be ‘pending’ or ‘may by law be brought’ before ‘any public
official.’”66  The Court held that the phrase “ ‘may by law be
brought’ conveys something within the specific duties of an
official’s position,” while the word “ ‘any’ conveys that the mat-
ter may be pending either before the public official who is per-
forming the official act, or before another public official.”67
Therefore, to prove that a public official performed an official
act, the government must demonstrate that the government
action that was the object of bribery could normally be re-
quested of some public official by law.68
Thereafter, the Court set out to determine the conduct that
would constitute a “decision or action” on the official matter or
question.69  Here, the Court rejected the Fourth Circuit’s inter-
pretation, holding that “the public official must make a deci-
62 Id. at 2368.
63 Id. at 2369.
64 See id. at 2372; see also United States v. Jones, 207 F. Supp. 3d 576,
580–81 (E.D.N.C. 2016) (summarizing the two-part test).
65 McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2368 (citing Crimes Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 117 (for
use of these terms in judicial proceeding context); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 278–79,
400, 1602–03 (4th ed. 1951) (for definition of these terms); 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(3)
(for use of these terms within the same statute)).  The Chief Justice also noted that
while “question” and “matter” could be defined broadly, “the familiar interpretive
canon noscitur a sociis, ‘a word is known by the company it keeps,’” urged a
narrow reading. Id.  Moreover, interpreting “question” and “matter” broadly would
render the other terms impermissibly superfluous. See id. at 2369 (citing Arling-
ton Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 299 n.1 (2006)).
66 Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3)).
67 Id.
68 See id. (“Economic development is not naturally described as a matter
‘pending’ before a public official—or something that may be brought ‘by law’
before him—any more than ‘justice’ is pending or may be brought by law before a
judge, or ‘national security’ is pending or may be brought by law before an officer
of the Armed Forces.”).
69 See id. at 2370.
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sion or take an action on” an official matter or question, not
merely act in a manner “related to a pending question or mat-
ter.”70  An official could also be prosecuted for agreeing to per-
form the official act, even if the official never intended to
perform.71  Nonetheless, “meeting with other officials, or speak-
ing with interested parties is not, standing alone, a ‘decision or
action.’”72  That being said, such meetings and parties could
“serve as evidence of an agreement to take an official act,” if the
“official was attempting to pressure or advise another official on
a pending matter.”73  What the prosecution must show is that
“the public official . . . intend[ed] to exert pressure on another
official or provide advice, knowing or intending such advice to
form the basis for an ‘official act.’”74
Applying these rules to the facts of the case, the Court
found that the jury instructions were inadequate, because it
was neither clear that the “jury reached its verdict after finding
. . . formal exercise of governmental power,” nor that McDonnell
“agree[d] to make a decision or take an action on” that formal
exercise.75  In other words, it was unclear whether McDonnell
“expected [his subordinates] to do anything other than” attend
the meeting; a conviction requires evidence that McDonnell
intended to pressure or advise his subordinates to adopt Anat-
abloc.76  Accordingly, the Court vacated the judgment of the
Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings.77
D. No Mens Rea, No Corruption
Reactions to the McDonnell decision were quite polarized,
with some condemning it as a “decimation of . . . anti-corrup-
tion laws”78 and others dismissing it as unremarkable.79  In
Tawdry or Corrupt?—currently one of the most extensive re-
70 Id.
71 Id. at 2371.
72 Id. at 2370 (citing United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S.
398, 407 (1999)).
73 Id. at 2371.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 2374–75.
76 See id.
77 Id. at 2375.
78 Rob Hager, Supreme Court Legalizes Influence Peddling: McDonnell v.
United States, COUNTERPUNCH (June 30, 2016), http://www.counterpunch.org/
2016/06/30/supreme-court-legalizes-influence-peddling-mcdonnell-v-united-
states [http://perma.cc/LQW7-TU2Q].
79 See Case Comment, Federal Corruption Statutes—Bribery—Definition of
“Official Act”—McDonnell v. United States, 130 HARV. L. REV. 467, 476 (2016)
(“McDonnell may best be understood as revising jury instructions rather than
rewriting what constitutes corruption itself.”).
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views of McDonnell—Harvey Silverglate and Emma Quinn-
Judge assert that the Court’s definition of official action is still
too ambiguous and “poses grave risks of prosecution without
fair notice.”80  According to their article, too fine of a line exists
between, for example, “narrowing down the list of potential
research topics”—an official act, and “gather[ing] additional in-
formation”—not an official act.81  Silverglate and Quinn-Judge
claim that “this very fine distinction . . . disappears completely
when the question shifts to performance of an official act,”82
because the jury is permitted to conclude that “the official was
attempting to pressure or advise another official on a pending
matter.”83  Accordingly, they conclude that the prosecution
could hold any official liable “so long as it can find some con-
nection to an official act—be it a ‘qualifying step’ on the road to
a decision or an attempt to exert pressure or offer advice to
another official who is performing an official act.”84
The analysis of Silverglate and Quinn-Judge, while appeal-
ing at first glance, fails to fully extrapolate the two-part test the
Court created.  They err in their claim that the prosecution
could establish an official act by showing that “the official was
attempting to pressure or advise another official on a pending
matter.”85  That is, the article confounds three distinct scena-
rios the Court attempted to keep separate: first, where officials
act within their duty; second, where officials attempt to influ-
ence other officials in performance of their duty; and third,
where officials advise other officials.86  The elements necessary
to prove each of these scenarios differ.  First, when an official
performs “the function conferred by the authority of his office,”
the prosecution must prove no more than that the official
80 Harvey A. Silverglate & Emma Quinn-Judge, Tawdry or Corrupt? McDon-
nell Fails to Draw a Clear Line for Federal Prosecution of State Officials, 2016 CATO
SUP. CT. REV. 189, 206–07 (2016) (quoting McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct.
2355, 2373 (2016)) (internal quotations omitted).
81 Id. at 205 (quoting McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2370) (internal quotations
omitted).
82 Id. at 205.
83 Id. at 206 (quoting McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2371) (internal quotations
omitted).
84 Id. (quoting McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2370).
85 Id. (quoting McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2371) (internal quotations omitted).
86 See McDonnell, 136 S. Ct at 2372 (“[T]he public official must make a deci-
sion or take an action on [a] question . . . or . . . us[e] his official position to exert
pressure on another official . . . or  . . . advise another official.” (internal quotations
omitted)).
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“agreed to perform . . . at the time of the alleged quid pro quo.”87
Second, when an official “us[es] his official position to exert
pressure on another official to perform an ‘official act,’” the
prosecution must show that the official intended to exert pres-
sure.88  Third, the official act requirement is established if an
official “advise[s] another official, knowing or intending that
such advice will form the basis for an ‘official act’ by another
official.”89  In other words, the Court added mens rea require-
ments for prosecutions arising out of bribes received in ex-
change for advice or influence, whereas bribes in exchange for
an act lack such a requirement.
The Court’s addition of a mens rea requirement is not with-
out significance.  Lower tribunals generally do not require the
prosecution to prove the public official’s mental state as to
performing the official act, but merely that he or she knew the
nature of what he or she was receiving.90  Mens rea require-
ments complicate prosecutions, as prosecutors must invest
more time and resources to obtain the requisite evidence.91
This is particularly true in the white-collar crime context,
where the presence of many actors diffuses evidence of individ-
ual involvement.92  Furthermore, the intent requirement would
also introduce the possibility of mistake of fact as a defense—
87 Id. at 2369, 2371 (noting that for such cases “[t]he jury may consider a
broad range of pertinent evidence, including the nature of the transaction, to
answer that question”).
88 Id. at 2370, 2371 (“Simply expressing support for the research study at a
meeting, event, or call—or sending a subordinate to such a meeting, event, or
call—similarly does not qualify as a decision or action on the study, as long as the
public official does not intend to exert pressure on another official.” (emphasis
added)).
89 Id. at 2372 (emphasis added).  Courts of Appeals have begun to require the
government to prove knowledge. See, e.g., United States v. Repak, 852 F.3d 230,
258 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Evidence of Repak’s receipt of items knowing he was to
facilitate the award of those contracts provided a sufficient basis for a rational
trier of fact to convict him of the Hobbs Act . . . .” (emphasis added)).
90 See, e.g., United States v. Nagin, 810 F.3d 348, 351 (5th Cir. 2016) (“[A]
conviction for bribery . . . does not require proof that the official intended to be
influenced in his official actions.”); United States v. Morgan, 635 F. App’x 423,
431 & n.13 (10th Cir. 2015) (“The key question in this case . . . is . . . whether [the
defendant] had the intent to receive the retainer fees . . . in exchange for his
legislative influence. . . .  [I]t was not necessary for [the defendant] to have contem-
plated . . . any . . . specific act . . . .”); United States v. Peleti, 576 F.3d 377, 382
(7th Cir. 2009) (“To commit bribery, the public official must receive the money
‘corruptly.’  An officer can act corruptly without intending to be influenced.” (cita-
tion omitted)).
91 Cf. Andrew J. Ceresney, Gordon Eng & Sean R. Nuttall, Regulatory Investi-
gations and the Credit Crisis: The Search for Villains, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 225, 228
(2009) (in the credit fraud context).
92 See John Hasnas, Ethics and the Problem of White Collar Crime, 54 AM. U.
L. REV. 579, 593 (2005).
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that a defendant “honestly believed in a set of facts that would
prevent him from forming the requisite mens rea.”93  Thus, the
Court established additional hurdles the prosecutions would
have to overcome in addition to traditional defenses—e.g., en-
trapment, due process, duress, or coercion94—and the defend-
ants’ claim that extensive media coverage of their case—
corruption cases make front-page headlines95—unduly influ-
enced the jurors.96
This is not to say, however, that by introducing an addi-
tional mens rea requirement, the Court has “decimat[ed] . . .
anti-corruption laws.”97  The Court is unlikely to require direct
evidence of the public official’s intent to influence another offi-
cial, because such a requirement could allow “the law’s effects
[to] be frustrated by knowing winks and nods.”98  Lower tribu-
nals, therefore, generally permit use of circumstantial evidence
to infer intent, particularly where direct evidence is likely to be
scanty.99  Accordingly, courts will almost certainly allow cir-
cumstantial evidence to prove the public official’s intent to in-
fluence another official.
Unfortunately, McDonnell did not address whether the cir-
cumstantial evidence in the record was sufficient to establish
intent.  It remains to be seen, therefore, just how difficult it
would be for the prosecution to prove an intent to influence.
For the time being, however, one cannot conclude that the
McDonnell decision is overall insignificant.  Fundamentally, the
Court is admitting that without the mens rea, McDonnell’s con-
93 David A. Maas, Comment, Policing the Ratings Agencies: The Case for
Stronger Criminal Disincentives in the Credit Rating Market, 101 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1005, 1027 (2011) (citing Model Penal Code § 2.04 (1985)).
94 For a summary of these defenses and citation to cases where such defenses
have been raised, see Lapidus & Mogilevich, supra note 27, at 926–29. R
95 See In re Providence Journal Co., Inc., 293 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2002).
96 See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031–32 (1984) (citing Irvin v. Dowd,
366 U.S. 717 (1961)).
97 Hager, supra note 78; see also Wertheimer, supra note 10 (“[T]he Court has R
substantially weakened the legal protections that currently exist against govern-
ment corruption.”).
98 Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 274 (1992) (allowing circumstantial
evidence to prove an implicit agreement).
99 See, e.g., United States v. Rohn, 964 F.2d 310, 313 (4th Cir. 1992) (“Be-
cause intent is ‘rarely capable of direct proof,’ . . . ‘[a] defendant’s intent can be
inferred from his conduct and all the surrounding circumstances.’” (alteration in
original) (first quoting United States v. Johnson, 767 F.2d 673, 676 (10th Cir.
1985); then quoting United States v. Vigil-Montanel, 753 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir.
1985))); United States v. Reeves, 730 F.2d 1189, 1195 (8th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he jury
must determine the issue of intent from all the circumstances of the case
‘[b]ecause the element of knowledge is rarely capable of direct proof.’” (alteration
in original) (citation omitted)).
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duct is not criminal.100 McDonnell will necessarily result in
convictions overturned and charges dismissed.101  After all, the
McDonnell decision resulted in the Department of Justice dis-
missing the charges against Governor McDonnell.102
II
DRAWING A LINE BETWEEN CORRUPTION AND
POLITICAL SPEECH
In his brief, Governor McDonnell argued that the bribery
statute, as applied by the government, implicates First Amend-
ment rights per the Citizens United v. Federal Election Commis-
sion line of cases.103  The Court neither addressed nor cited
Citizens United in its decision, choosing instead to offer consti-
tutional concerns of vagueness and broadness in support of its
decision.104  As this Part will show, however, the Court’s hold-
ing conforms to the law established by Citizens United and
McCutcheon.105  This interpretation suggests that Citizens
United and McCutcheon may affect anti-corruption efforts be-
yond the campaign financing setting.
Prior to McDonnell, Professor George Brown argued in Ap-
plying Citizens United to Ordinary Corruption that Citizens
United is limited to the campaign finance setting and that cam-
paign finance corruption differs from criminal corruption.106
100 See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2009 (2015) (“[W]rongdoing
must be conscious to be criminal.” (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S.
246, 250 (1952)).
101 See Daniel Richman & Jennifer Rodgers, Rewarding Subtlety: McDonnell v.
United States, COMPLIANCE & ENFORCEMENT (Jul. 5, 2016), https://wp.nyu.edu/
compliance_enforcement/2016/07/05/rewarding-subtlety-mcdonnell-v-united-
states/ [http://perma.cc/D9MU-WWXG] (noting that McDonnell may affect a
“small number of cases” where “it is not entirely clear that governmental power
was exercise[d] or promised”).
102 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Moves to
Dismiss McDonnell Charges (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
justice-department-moves-dismiss-mcdonnell-charges [http://perma.cc/UC49-
VY76].
103 See Brief of Petitioner at 24–25, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct.
2355 (2016) (No. 15-474).
104 See McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2372–73 (2016) (noting that the government
asserted that receipt of anything “from a campaign contribution to lunch . . .
counts as a quid,” but that such an interpretation would prevent officials from
meeting with a “union [that] had given a campaign contribution in the past”).
105 See also Malloy, supra note 6 (noting that the Court’s reading of “official R
acts” reflected “[t]he vision of politics articulated in Citizens United and
McCutcheon”).
106 See George D. Brown, Applying Citizens United to Ordinary Corruption:
With a Note on Blagojevich, McDonnell, and the Criminalization of Politics, 91
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 177, 233 (2015) [hereinafter Brown, Applying Citizens
United].  There are other scholars who agree with Professor Brown. See, e.g.,
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Other scholars, like Professor Zephyr Teachout in Corruption in
America, suggest that the Supreme Court may be adopting a
uniform and narrow definition of corruption in campaign fi-
nance cases and criminal prosecutions.107  This Note agrees
with Professor Teachout’s observation.  As the following discus-
sion shows, the Supreme Court traditionally held a single defi-
nition of corruption applicable in both campaign finance and
criminal law settings, and although the Court later distin-
guished criminal corruption from campaign finance corrup-
tion, the Court is moving to unify the definitions again.
A. Originally, Corruption Was Viewed as the Bane of
Society, a Moral Evil, and an Act Entirely Separate
from Political Activity
The founding years evince American society’s conscious
struggle against corruption.  The founding fathers sought to
combat corruption by establishing procedural safeguards
against it within the Constitution.108  State and federal juris-
prudence reflected the belief that combatting corruption was a
natural prerogative of government.109  Thus, Congress could
vote to charge individuals with corruption and adjudicate the
charges within its halls.110  Some federal and state courts per-
Ilissa B. Gold, Explicit, Express, and Everything in Between: The Quid Pro Quo
Requirement for Bribery and Hobbs Act Prosecutions in the 2000s, 36 WASH. U. J.L.
& POL’Y 261, 288 (2011) (noting that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit requires explicit quid pro quo agreement to be shown in all cases of
corruption, while other Courts of Appeals require this only in campaign contribu-
tion context).  After McDonnell, Professor Brown admitted that the Supreme Court
blurred the line between ordinary and campaign finance corruption, but he ulti-
mately concluded that the law remains unchanged. See George D. Brown, Mc-
Donnell and the Criminalization of Politics, 5 VA. J. CRIM. L. 1, 31 (2017)
[hereinafter Brown, Criminalization of Politics].
107 See ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA 227–29 (2014) (noting that the
Court lacks “understanding of the corrosive power of gifts and subtle influence,”
and that the Court’s bribery decisions, “[i]f . . . read . . . as political theory, . . .
suggest[ ] that using money to influence power through gifts is both inevitable and
not troubling.  In so doing, [the Court] set the table for . . . [its] major corruption
decision in Citizens United”); see also Jacob Eisler, The Unspoken Institutional
Battle over Anticorruption: Citizens United, Honest Services, and the Legislative-
Judicial Divide, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 363, 365–66 (2011) (discussing how in both
the campaign finance and criminal corruption contexts the Court has constrained
broad anti-corruption measures passed by Congress).
108 See Zephyr Teachout, The Historical Roots of Citizens United v. FEC: How
Anarchists and Academics Accidentally Created Corporate Speech Rights, 5 HARV.
L. & POL’Y REV. 163, 165 (2011) (citing Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption
Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 353 (2009)).
109 See id. at 166 (citing Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 657–58 (1884).
110 See, e.g., 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 166–70 (1795) (discussing the case of Randall
and Whitney).
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mitted corruption to be prosecuted as a common law of-
fense.111  Throughout this ardent war on corruption, Congress
and the Court believed corruption could undo governments.
Senators believed themselves to be enacting statutes, for exam-
ple, to preserve the proper “character of the Government” and
the honor of public office.112  Likewise, the Supreme Court
harshly decried attempts to influence politicians with gifts and
bribes, believing that such conduct would cause “corruption
[to] become the normal condition of the body politic.”113  The
Court sought to prevent nations to speak “of us as of Rome—
‘omne Romæ venale.’ ”114  Similarly, in the campaign finance
setting, the Court condemned lobbying as corruption and con-
cluded that its proscription was necessary to maintain public
morals.115
The Court retained this view of campaign finance corrup-
tion well into the mid-twentieth century and so granted Con-
gress broad latitude in regulating campaign contributions.  In
Burroughs v. United States, for example, the Court authorized
Congress to “safeguard . . . an election from the improper use of
money” and “preserve the departments and institutions of the
general government from impairment or destruction, whether
threatened by force or by corruption.”116  A broad grant of
power was necessary because the Court defined corruption
broadly to include the “evil . . . [known as] the use of corpora-
tion or union funds to influence the public at large to vote for a
particular candidate or a particular party.”117  In other words,
any form of campaign contributions was viewed as corrupting
and morally deplorable.  The only corruption Congress could
not tackle was one it had no Constitutional power to reach.118
During the same time period, the Court defined criminal
corruption broadly to encompass any attempt to unduly influ-
111 See, e.g., United States v. Coolidge, 25 F. Cas. 619, 620 (C.C.D. Mass.
1813), rev’d 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415 (1816) (noting that federal courts have juris-
diction over bribery crimes committed against the United States under common
law); Bedinger v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. (3 Call) 461, 463 (1803) (“An attempt to
bribe is criminal, at common law.”).
112 CONG. GLOBE, 32d Cong., 2d Sess. 242 (1853) (explaining the purpose
behind the Act to Prevent Frauds upon the Treasury of the United States, 10 Stat
170).
113 Marshall v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 335–36 (1853).
114 Id.
115 See Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 441, 450–51 (1874).
116 Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545 (1934).
117 United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 589 (1957).
118 See Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 247–49 (1921) (holding that
Congress had no power to criminalize solicitation of campaign contributions or
restricting “the maximum sum which a candidate [for office] . . . may spend”).
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ence a public official.  In 1914, the Court held that the bribery
statute encompassed “[e]very action that is within the range of
official dut[ies],” including those “established by settled prac-
tice.”119  Just as it did in the campaign finance context, the
Court recognized attempts to unduly influence a public official
as corruption and a moral evil.  The Court in United States v.
Hood, for example, upheld a statute criminalizing sale of public
office on the grounds that it “attack[ed] that evil” of “the opera-
tion of purchased . . . influence in determining the occupants of
federal office.”120  Similarly in United States v. Shirey, the Court
permitted Congress “to proscribe payments to political parties
in return for influence.”121  Again, the Court’s view on criminal
corruption did not differ from campaign finance corruption.
The Court held a single view of corruption in both cam-
paign finance and criminal law settings.  No case illustrates
this better than United States v. Brewster, where the Court
considered “whether a Member of Congress may be prosecuted
[for bribery] under 18 U.S.C. §§ 201(c)(1), 201(g).”122  The de-
fendant-appellee argued that the Speech and Debate clause of
the Constitution prevented the government from alleging that
he supported a bill in return for a bribe, but the majority dis-
missed this argument.123  Writing for the majority, Chief Jus-
tice Warren Burger held any receipt of funds as corruption that
could “not, by any conceivable interpretation, [be] an act per-
formed as a part of or even incidental to the role of a legisla-
tor.”124  In other words, Chief Justice Burger could not imagine
a setting where payments in exchange for legislation could be
anything other than criminal corruption.  The Court simply
lacked a distinction between campaign finance and criminal
corruption.
B. To Protect Campaign Financing, the Court Diverged
Corruption into Campaign Finance Corruption and
Criminal Corruption
Just as Brewster illustrated the unity of corruption in
those early cases, it also paved the way for the birth of the
distinction between campaign finance corruption and criminal
corruption.  Writing for the Brewster dissent, Justice William
119 United States v. Birdsall, 233 U.S. 223, 230–31 (1914).
120 See 343 U.S. 148, 150–51 (1952).
121 See United States v. Shirey, 359 U.S. 255, 259–60 (1959).  Sale of influence
was likewise viewed as an evil. See id. at 261–62.
122 408 U.S. 501, 502 (1972).
123 See id. at 506–07.
124 Id. at 526.
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Brennan argued that the Speech and Debate clause barred
Brewster’s prosecution, and that 18 U.S.C. § 201 impermissi-
bly “adjust[ed] . . . [the Congressman’s] rights to due process
and free expression.”125  A majority of the Supreme Court
echoed Justice Brennan’s concern in Buckley v. Valeo126—the
origin of the contemporary campaign finance law.127  There, the
Supreme Court examined whether Congress could impose lim-
its on contributions and expenditures.128  Though it upheld
contribution limits,129 the Court declared expenditure limits as
burdening “core First Amendment expression.”130  Most rele-
vantly, the Court argued that, unlike direct contributions, ex-
penditures lack “prearrangement and coordination . . . with the
candidate or his agent,” and this “alleviates the danger that
expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper com-
mitments from the candidate.”131  The distinguishing factor be-
tween contribution limitations and expenditure limitations
was, therefore, whether the Court believed that the limitation
adequately prevented corruption.  Here, however, corruption
carried a definition unique to the campaign contribution
setting.132
From this point, campaign finance corruption began to di-
verge from criminal corruption.  The Court still continued to
articulate a broad definition of campaign finance corruption.
In 1990, the Court upheld Michigan’s expenditure regulation
not because it addressed the “danger of ‘financial quid pro quo’
corruption,” but because it “aim[ed] at a different type of cor-
ruption in the political arena: the corrosive and distorting ef-
fects of immense aggregations of wealth.”133  In Nixon v. Shrink
Missouri Government PAC, the Court upheld a Missouri contri-
bution limitation, stating that “Congress could constitutionally
address the power of money ‘to influence governmental ac-
125 Id. at 544 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
126 424 U.S. 1, 13 (1976) (per curiam).
127 See, e.g., Jordan May, Note, “Are We Corrupt Enough Yet?” The Ambiguous
Quid Pro Quo Corruption Requirement in Campaign Finance Restrictions, 54 WASH-
BURN L.J. 357, 361 (2015) (discussing how the Court’s jurisprudence evolved
when defining how compelling government interests must be to justify campaign
finance restrictions).
128 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 13–14.
129 See id. at 29–30, 35–38.
130 Id. at 48.
131 Id. at 47.
132 See Almendares & Hafer, supra note 4, at 2777 (“[W]hen the Supreme R
Court’s majority and plurality opinions in . . . [campaign finance] cases use the
term ‘corruption,’ they are best understood as saying ‘corruption as defined by
Buckley.’”).
133 Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659–60 (1990).
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tion.’”134  The Court thus recognized that “in addition to ‘quid
pro quo arrangements,’” Congress had to address the problems
of “ ‘improper influence’ and ‘opportunities for abuse.’”135
Based on this broader understanding of corruption, the gov-
ernment had broad power to regulate campaign financing.
This language culminated in McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission, where the Court upheld limitations on campaign
contributions and expenditures, stating that Congress had the
power to limit “undue influence on an officeholder’s judgment,
and the appearance of such influence.”136
The definition of criminal corruption, on the other hand,
the Court began to narrow.  In McCormick v. United States, the
Court could not have been more explicit in separating the two
areas of law: it reversed a conviction because the jury instruc-
tions failed to properly separate voluntary campaign contribu-
tions from extortion.137  Writing for the majority, Justice Byron
White defined criminal corruption as excluding favoritism in
exchange for campaign contributions:
[T]o hold that legislators commit the federal crime of extortion
when they act for the benefit of constituents or support legis-
lation furthering the interests of some of their constituents,
shortly before or after campaign contributions are solicited
and received from those beneficiaries, is an unrealistic as-
sessment of what Congress could have meant by making it a
crime to obtain property from another . . . “under color of
official right.”138
Whereas in Brewster such conduct amounted to a crime, Jus-
tice White argued in McCormick that this conduct was “the
everyday business of a legislator” that has “long been thought
to be well within the law [and] . . . in a very real sense . . .
unavoidable so long as election campaigns are financed by pri-
vate contributions or expenditures.”139  This view of corruption
is in stark odds with the one advanced in Austin: that corrup-
tion includes “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense
aggregations of wealth.”140  Thus, criminal corruption diverged
from campaign finance corruption.  While some could reconcile
134 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000).
135 Id.
136 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 95 (2003) (quoting FEC v. Colo. Republican
Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431 (2001)).
137 See 500 U.S. 257, 271–73 (1991) (discussing Hobbs Act extortion, 18
U.S.C. § 1951 (2012)).
138 Id. at 272.
139 Id.
140 Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659–60 (1990).
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the differences outlined above,141 it suffices to say that the
Supreme Court has treated corruption in the campaign finance
setting differently than in the criminal setting.
C. Recently, the Court Began to Reunify Corruption,
Conforming Criminal Corruption to Campaign
Finance Corruption
Professor Brown asserts that the two views of corruption
thus separated, remained separate, and ought to remain sepa-
rate.142  The normative assertion aside, this Note disagrees
with Professor Brown’s conclusion because the Court began to
re-unify its views of corruption.  In Austin, Justice Anthony
Kennedy condemned the majority’s decision to expand the defi-
nition of corruption.143  Similarly, in Shrink Missouri Govern-
ment PAC, Justice Clarence Thomas doubted whether
campaign contribution regulation adequately addressed cor-
ruption.144  The Court began to agree with Justices Kennedy
and Thomas starting in the 2006 case of Randall v. Sorrell,
holding that limits on individual contributions and expenditure
limits are unconstitutional when they are not narrowly tai-
lored.145  By 2010, in Citizens United v. Federal Election Com-
mission, the Court’s majority sided with Justice Kennedy and
Justice Thomas when it declared independent expenditure lim-
itations unconstitutional, overruling Austin and McConnell.146
The Court dispelled any notion that the government could jus-
tify campaign financing regulation by claiming to curb im-
proper influence, stating “[t]he fact that speakers may have
influence over or access to elected officials does not mean that
these officials are corrupt.”147  In other words, the Court’s defi-
nition of corruption changed.  Congress could no longer pro-
141 See Eisler, supra note 107, at 401, 425 (noting that both Austin and McCor- R
mick advance a competitive approach to politics).
142 See Brown, Applying Citizens United, supra note 106, at 182, 209. R
143 494 U.S. at 703 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Since the specter of corruption
. . . is missing in this case, the majority invents a new interest . . . [which] [t]he
majority styles . . . as simply a different kind of corruption . . . .”).
144 Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 425 (2000) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (“I cannot fathom how a $251 contribution could pose a substantial
risk of ‘secur[ing] a political quid pro quo.’” (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
26 (1976)).
145 See 548 U.S. 230, 261 (2006) (“[T]he Act burdens First Amendment inter-
ests by threatening to inhibit effective advocacy by those who seek election, par-
ticularly challengers; its contribution limits mute the voice of political parties;
they hamper participation in campaigns through volunteer activities; and they are
not indexed for inflation.”).
146 See 558 U.S. 310, 365–66 (2010).
147 Id. at 359.
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hibit campaign contributions that resulted in ingratiation and
access because “[i]ngratiation and access . . . are not corrup-
tion.”148  Regulation was unconstitutional if it did not target
the Court’s definition of corruption.149  This is true even if the
regulation was in response to actual corruption.150
The previously broad understanding of corruption was
narrowed significantly in 2014, when Chief Justice Roberts,
writing for the plurality in McCutcheon v. Federal Election Com-
mission, curtailed corruption to quid pro quo arrangements
and appearance thereof.151  “[A]ppearance of corruption,” the
plurality noted, “ ‘stem[s] from public awareness of the opportu-
nities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual finan-
cial contributions’ to particular candidates.”152  Nonetheless,
federal and state governments could only seek to prevent “the
appearance of quid pro quo corruption[—]the Government may
not seek to limit the appearance of mere influence or ac-
cess.”153  Thus limited, the Chief Justice had little trouble dis-
missing the federal government’s claim that aggregate limits on
contributions prevented quid pro quo corruption.154
Just as Justice Kennedy’s view of corruption prevailed in
the context of campaign finance, so too his view prevailed in
criminal law.  In 1992, Justice Kennedy earned a spot in the
limelight, composing an often-cited concurring opinion in Ev-
ans v. United States.155  There, he explicitly limited an anti-
corruption statute to quid pro quo corruption and delineated
the requisite evidence for proving a quid pro quo.156  His expla-
nation, however, granted the government broad latitude in
proving their case: quid pro quo could be “implied from [the
official’s] words and actions,” to avoid having “the law’s effect
. . . frustrated by knowing winks and nods.”157  This language
led Professor Brown to interpret Justice Kennedy as endorsing
148 Id. at 360.
149 See Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (per
curiam) (holding Montana’s independent expenditure limitation
unconstitutional).
150 See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[I]ndependent expenditures by corpora-
tions did in fact lead to corruption or the appearance of corruption in Montana.”).
151 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1450 (2014) (“Congress may target only a specific type of
corruption—‘quid pro quo’ corruption.”).
152 Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976)) (citing Citizens United,
558 U.S. at 359).
153 Id. at 1451 (citing Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360).
154 See id. at 1451.
155 See Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 273–78 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (in the context of Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012) extortion).
156 See id. at 274–75
157 Id. at 274.
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a broad view of corruption, inconsistent with the narrow view
advanced in campaign finance cases.158  While it is true that
Justice Kennedy’s opinion allowed the prosecution greater lati-
tude in proving its case—at least in non-campaign contribution
cases159—his definition of corruption did not change from his
dissent in Austin.  In the concurring opinion in Evans and the
dissent in Austin, Justice Kennedy limited corruption to quid
pro quo arrangements.160  In fact, Justice Kennedy explicitly
noted in Evans that the rationale behind the requirement for a
quid pro quo in campaign contribution cases and in Hobbs Act
prosecution cases is the same.161  Thus, Evans does not stand
for a broad view of corruption.  The strongest evidence in sup-
port of this proposition is the fact that the Justices heralding a
narrow view of criminal corruption in Evans—Antonin Scalia,
Thomas, and Kennedy—later advocated for a narrow view of
campaign finance corruption.162
Thereafter, Justice Kennedy’s definition of criminal corrup-
tion became mainstream, with a unanimous Court holding that
bribery requires “a quid pro quo—a specific intent to give or
receive something of value in exchange for an official act.”163
The Court limited criminal corruption to quid pro quo arrange-
ments, noting that prosecution had to prove more than that
money was paid for goodwill.164  The Supreme Court then de-
158 See Brown, Applying Citizens United, supra note 106, at 179. R
159 See Gold, supra note 106, at 288 (noting that the U.S. Court of Appeals for R
the Eleventh Circuit requires explicit agreement to be shown in all cases, while
other circuits require this only in the campaign contribution context).
160 Compare Evans, 504 U.S. at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Thus, I agree
with the Court, that the quid pro quo requirement is not simply made up.”), with
Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 703 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (noting that to reach their holding the majority had to invent new
forms of corruption because quid pro quo corruption was lacking).
161 See Evans, 504 U.S. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
162 See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 273–74 (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (noting that newly recognized form of corruption “is
antithetical to everything for which the First Amendment stands”); id. at 248
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the statute
“cut[ ] to the heart of what the First Amendment is meant to protect”); id. at 292
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Buckley made clear, by
its express language and its context, that the corruption interest only justifies
regulating candidates’ and officeholders’ receipt of what we can call the ‘quids’ in
the quid pro quo formulation.”); see also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S.
377, 406 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority improperly
expanded Buckley); id. at 422 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court had
always understood corruption in “the narrow quid pro quo sense”).
163 United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 404–05
(1999).
164 See id. at 414.
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cided Skilling v. United States.165  The Skilling Court did not,
however, address corruption, holding no more than that the
honest services fraud statute covers kickbacks and bribery.166
After Skilling, Courts of Appeals continue to be divided on
whether the definition of corruption in the campaign finance
context applies in the criminal corruption context.167
D. McDonnell Signals the Impending Demise of the
Distinction
Professor Brown ends his survey here, concluding that
views of corruption still remain separate and that Citizens
United exercises no force outside the campaign finance con-
text.168  He asserts that a narrow view of corruption has no
place in the criminal law context, where “concepts of equality
and neutrality reign.”169  Professor Brown’s analysis can be
challenged in numerous ways.  For one, the Court has consist-
ently held that equality and neutrality have no place in polit-
ics.170  Secondly, Professor Brown’s analysis may
underestimate the importance of Citizens United and McCutch-
eon—decisions that stripped Congress of its once broad power
to regulate campaign financing.171  Potential analytical criti-
ques aside, McDonnell cast uncertainty over Professor Brown’s
conclusion—a fact he admitted, albeit with reservation.172
165 See 561 U.S. 358 (2010).
166 See id. at 408.
167 See Gold, supra note 106, at 288. R
168 See Brown, Applying Citizens United, supra note 106, at 233. R
169 Id. at 216.
170 See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1667 (2015) (“Politicians
are expected to be appropriately responsive to the preferences of their support-
ers. . . .  A judge instead must ‘observe the utmost fairness . . . .’” (quoting Address
of John Marshall (Dec. 11, 1829), in PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE VIRGINIA
STATE CONVENTION OF 1829–30, at 616 (Richmond, Samuel Shepherd & Co. 1830)).
In Williams-Yulee, the Court distinguished judges from politicians, reaffirming the
longstanding state interest of preserving judicial independence. See id.; see also
United States v. Hatter, 535 U.S. 557, 568–69 (2001) (Address of John Marshall,
supra, at 619).  Moreover, in Williams-Yulee the Court again reiterated that Con-
gress can only prevent “appearance of corruption in legislative and executive
elections.” Williams-Yulee, 136 S. Ct. at 1667 (“[A] State’s interest in preserving
public confidence in the integrity of its judiciary extends beyond its interest in
preventing the appearance of corruption in legislative and executive elections.”).
171 See TEACHOUT, supra note 107, at 244 (“Citizens United changed the culture R
at the same time that it changed the law.  It reframed that which was unpatriotic
and named it patriotic.”); Eisler, supra note 107, at 409 (“The cumulative effect of R
Citizens United was to strip federal campaign finance regulation to a competitive
core.”).
172 See Brown, Criminalization of Politics, supra note 106, at 22, 31 (“The case R
may be a step [toward ‘enshrin[ing] bribery in our politics’], but it is at best a
tentative one that does not break new ground.” (quoting Dante Ramos, Va. Ex-
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The McDonnell Court espouses the holdings of Citizen
United and McCutcheon.  Granted, the Court never squarely
addressed McDonnell’s Citizens United argument.173  Chief
Justice Roberts’s public policy justification for the holding,
however, closely mirrors the Court’s logic in McCutcheon—a
decision he authored.  The first policy reason Chief Justice
Roberts offered in support of the McDonnell decision is that
broad application of bribery statutes could deter officials from
“respond[ing] to even the most commonplace requests for as-
sistance,” and citizens “from participating in democratic dis-
course.”174  This formulation raises the question of why broad
application of a bribery statute, or any other anti-corruption
statute, would deter citizens from democratic discourse.  That
is, if the citizen were merely speaking, there would be no
grounds for finding corruption—no quid.  Chief Justice Rob-
erts’s formulation only makes sense if the citizen engages in
democratic discourse with money or other consideration, as in
Citizens United.175  Similarly, anti-corruption statutes would
rarely apply to an official’s response to a constituent’s request
for assistance.  For example, no one would suspect corruption
if a senator were to advocate a bill to assist victims of a natural
disaster.  Common sense dictates that official acts that benefit
the public in general would make for poor prosecutions.  Anti-
corruption statutes are only relevant, therefore, when a public
official shows undue favor to an individual or a select group of
individuals in exchange for some benefit.  Thus explained, the
Chief Justice appears concerned that broad bribery statutes
would deter citizens from contributing funds in exchange for
special treatment.  In fact, the Chief Justice labels such ex-
changes as “participat[ion] in democratic discourse” rather
than corruption.176  Accordingly, Chief Justice Roberts’s public
policy concern is congruent with Citizens United’s First Amend-
ment concern.177  As in Citizens United, the McDonnell Court
governor Wins at Supreme Court, but Corruption Is Still Illegal, BOS. GLOBE (June
27, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2016/06/27/governor-wins-
supreme-court-but-corruption-still-illegal/1UHYwo06otnV9wkXgU0gLJ/
story.html [https://perma.cc/3P2K-WJFA]).
173 See McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2372 (2016).
174 Id.
175 See 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19
(1976)).
176 136 S. Ct. at 2372.
177 See 558 U.S. at 359 (“The fact that speakers may have influence over . . .
officials does not mean that these officials are corrupt,” because “[f]avoritism and
influence are not . . . avoidable in representative politics.” (quoting McConnell v.
FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part))).
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asserts that “[i]ngratiation and access . . . are not
corruption.”178
The McDonnell decision may have profound effect on future
anti-corruption efforts.  For one, the Court has again proved its
commitment to abandoning the anti-corruption values “the
framers said they must provide, lest our government will soon
be at an end.”179  Additionally, as the McDonnell holding seems
to adopt campaign financing law, future defendants may elect
to challenge their prosecutions on First Amendment grounds.
Thus, lower tribunals may soon be asked to decide the consti-
tutionality of existing anti-corruption statutes.  The next Part
will address the potential merit of such challenges.
III
A LINE DRAWN TOO FAR: A FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
CORRUPT YOUR POLITICIAN
The Constitution cannot be used as a shield against
charges of “bribery,” so long as the term is limited to quid pro
quo arrangements as the Supreme Court understands it.  But
outside the Court, bribery is not defined so narrowly.  Dictiona-
ries, for example, define it as money paid “to influence the
judgment or conduct”180 of a politician, or to “persuade (a per-
son, etc.) to act improperly in one’s favor.”181  Similarly, the
typical student understands bribery as the giving of something
of value in exchange for an “unfair advantage.”182  Even legal
dictionaries offer a definition broader than the Court’s: “[a]
price, reward, gift or favor bestowed or promised with a view to
pervert the judgment of or influence the action of a person in a
position of trust.”183  These definitions surely encompass the
selling of influence, favor, and access at issue in McDonnell.
Does the First Amendment guarantee the right to bribery, de-
fined as payments made to “pervert the judgment of or influ-
178 Id. at 360.
179 TEACHOUT, supra note 107, at 245 (internal quotations omitted) (citation R
omitted); see also Joseph P. Tomain, Gridlock, Lobbying, and Democracy, 7 WAKE
FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 87, 107–08 (2017) (“The Supreme Court does not have a
particularly realistic view of the democratic process and the ease with which
private money flows to public servants who are receptive to their particular
interests.”).
180 Bribe, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003).
181 Bribe, THE OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS WITH LANGUAGE
GUIDE (2003).
182 See Harvey S. James Jr., When Is a Bribe a Bribe? Teaching a Workable
Definition of Bribery, 6 TEACHING BUS. ETHICS 199, 205–06 (2002) (noting that
students most frequently define bribery as “unfair advantage”).
183 Bribe, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 217 (9th ed. 2009).
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ence the action of a person in a position of trust”?  Perhaps
inadvertently,184 McDonnell signals the existence of such First
Amendment guarantee.
The First Amendment often bars prosecutions and limits
the regulatory framework of the Federal Government and that
of the states.  But the Supreme Court in Roth v. United States
recognized that federal and state governments need to regulate
some speech, holding:
The guaranties of freedom of expression in effect in 10 of the
14 States which by 1792 had ratified the Constitution, gave
no absolute protection for every utterance.  Thirteen of the 14
States provided for the prosecution of libel, and all of those
States made either blasphemy or profanity, or both, statutory
crimes.185
On the other hand, “ideas having even the slightest redeeming
social importance . . . have the full protection of the guaranties,
unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area
of more important interests.”186  Thus, a letter arguably con-
taining threats could not be used to convict an individual if
that letter primarily addressed issues of public concern.187
Moreover, this protection is not limited to verbal speech but
extends to expressive speech, such as contributions to political
officials.188  Contributions to political officials, in fact, receive
the highest degree of protection because
[I]f it be conceded that the First Amendment was “fashioned
to assure the unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social changes desired by the people,”
. . . then it can hardly be doubted that the constitutional
guarantee has its fullest and most urgent application pre-
cisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office.189
The First Amendment, thus, protects political association inas-
much as it protects pure speech.190
184 Justice Stephen Breyer dismissed the defense’s attempt to frame the argu-
ment as relating to campaign contribution cases. See Transcript of Oral Argu-
ment at 31, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No. 15-474).
185 354 U.S. 476, 482 (1957) (footnotes omitted).
186 Id. at 484.
187 See Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 59 N.E.3d 1105, 1112 (Mass. 2016).
188 See Roth, 354 U.S. at 484 (citing United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612,
625 (1954) (discussing a campaign financing regulation that requires individuals
to register prior to donating to public officials)).
189 Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271–72 (1971) (citation omitted)
(quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 484).
190 See Thompson v. Dauphinais, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1023, 1027 (D. Alaska
2016).
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That the First Amendment protects political association
does not mean that it prohibits any regulation of political
speech.  Congress and the state governments may impose re-
strictions on political speech so long as a sufficiently important
interest is advanced.191  After McCutcheon, however, “the only
interests that can support contribution restrictions” are pre-
vention of “quid pro quo corruption[ ] or its appearance.”192
Now, per McDonnell, gifts to public officials solely in exchange
for gratuity or influence do not constitute quid pro quo corrup-
tion or its appearance.193  As gifts in return for gratuity and
influence do not constitute corruption, and certainly have “the
slightest redeeming social importance,”194 such contributions
are likely to enjoy “the full protection of the guaranties” of the
First Amendment.195  In any event, Congress and state govern-
ments lack a sufficiently important interest in regulating this
type of political speech.196  Accordingly, the First Amendment
could protect the exchange of bribes for influence, favor, and
advocacy.
Prior to McDonnell, such a defense never resulted in an
acquittal.  In United States v. Menendez, for example, the de-
fendants sought to dismiss the charges, citing Citizens United
and McCutcheon for the proposition that “the Constitution pro-
tects all ‘efforts to influence and obtain access to elected offi-
cials.’”197  The New Jersey District Court agreed, but held that
such a defense is inapplicable on the given facts.198  The Me-
191 See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1444 (2014)
192 Lair v. Bullock, 798 F.3d 736, 746–47 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2015).
193 See supra notes 173–79 and accompanying text. R
194 One argument advanced by amici in McDonnell was that influence peddling
encourages public officials to “collaborat[e] with local business leaders to en-
courage business development in their districts and provid[e] support to charita-
ble organizations.”  Brief for Members of the Va. Gen. Assembly as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 8, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (No.
15-474), 2016 WL 946983.
195 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
196 At least one anti-corruption statute has been held unconstitutional on
such First Amendment grounds, in the Kentucky case Shickel v. Dilger.  No. 2:15-
cv-155 (WOB-JGW), 2017 WL 2464998, at *7–11 (E.D. Ky. June 6, 2017).  In
granting a summary judgment motion against the State of Kentucky, Judge Wil-
liam Bertelsman held that a statute prohibiting a legislator from receiving “any-
thing of value from a legislative agent or an employer,” KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 6.751(2) (West 2010), “would deter people from engaging in activities which are
protected by . . . the liberty guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States.”
Shickel, 2017 WL 2464998, at *9.
197 132 F. Supp. 3d 635, 638 (D.N.J. 2015).
198 Id. at 639 (“Defendants are correct that attempts to influence a public
official through speech alone are protected.  But the Constitution does not protect
an attempt to influence a public official’s acts through improper means, such as
the bribery scheme that has been alleged in this case.” (emphasis added)).
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nendez prosecution alleged “a quid pro quo bribery scheme,”
whereby the defendants “conspired to offer . . . ‘things of value
to influence official acts benefitting [their] personal and busi-
ness interests.’”199  Similarly, in United States v. Halloran, the
defendant attempted to argue that Citizens United created “a
‘brave new world . . . in which the institutionalized bribery of
campaign finance . . . is constitutionally protected,’ thus ‘blur-
ring . . . the distinction between protected speech and brib-
ery.’”200  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
rejected such use of the First Amendment, holding that the
prosecution properly alleged quid pro quo corruption.201
There, the jury found that Halloran paid money in exchange for
an authorization to seek the nomination of a party the defen-
dant was not a member of—a “Wilson-Pakula.”202  The First
Amendment defense came closest to acquittal in United States
v. Dimora.203  Therein the defendant was convicted for, inter
alia, giving an individual “influence at Cuyahoga County and
. . . protection for [his] businesses,” in exchange for the individ-
ual “fund[ing] a trip to Las Vegas for Dimora, covering the costs
of gambling chips, luxury hotel suites and a $2,219 dinner.”204
On appeal over admissibility of certain documents that would
prove the transaction to be merely an exchange of favors, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held any error harm-
less, because the mere trading of “ ‘public influence’ . . . in
exchange for” a quid constituted criminal corruption.205  None-
theless, a member of the panel, Judge Gilbert Merritt, dis-
sented, arguing that Dimora could not be prosecuted if his
conduct amounted to no more than ingratiation and access
protected by the First Amendment.206  According to Judge Mer-
ritt, Dimora could have established that his relationships were
“of ‘ingratiation and access’ that may have been deplorable but
[were] arguably legal.”207  Thus, prior to McDonnell, the First
Amendment defense existed only in theory.208
199 Id. at 638.
200 821 F.3d 321, 340 (2d Cir. 2016).
201 Id.
202 See id. at 328–29.
203 750 F.3d 619, 623–24 (6th Cir. 2014).
204 Id. at 624.
205 Id. at 626.
206 See id. at 632–33 (Merritt, J., dissenting) (citing McCutcheon v. FEC, 134
S. Ct. 1434 (2014)).
207 Id. at 633 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
208 See also Trevor Potter, Wednesday Luncheon Session at the American Law
Institute 9 (May 23, 2012), http://2012am.ali.org/transcripts/Potter%20-%208-
3-12-(8)-WedLunch-Potter.pdf [http://perma.cc/97D7-NG97] (noting that “sys-
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McDonnell changed things.  On July 13, 2017, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit overturned the conviction of
New York State Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver, citing Mc-
Donnell v. United States.209  The prosecution charged Silver
with many corrupt schemes.  For example, Silver allegedly fun-
neled $500,000 in taxpayer-funded research grants to a doctor
in exchange for the doctor steering his patients to Silver’s law
firm.210  Silver also met with lobbyists, hosted parties and
voted for legislation that benefited real estate developers, alleg-
edly in exchange for the developers’ use of a law firm that paid
Silver referral fees.211  Despite finding ample evidence, the
Court of Appeals reversed Silver’s conviction and remanded for
a new trial, holding that the jury instruction “captured lawful
conduct, such as arranging meetings or hosting events with
constituents.”212  The jury instructions were overbroad be-
cause, post McDonnell, the instructions captured examples of
lawful influence peddling.  Does the reversal of Silver’s convic-
tion spell immediate doom for all anti-corruption efforts?  Most
likely not.  For one, Courts of Appeals appear reluctant to re-
verse convictions on facts different from McDonnell v. United
States.213  More importantly, the stream of benefits doctrine
complicates any First Amendment defense.  This doctrine loos-
ens the quid pro quo requirement, allowing conviction “so long
as the evidence shows a ‘course of conduct of favors and gifts
flowing to a public official in exchange for a pattern of official
actions favorable to the donor.’”214  In United States v. Kemp,
this doctrine allowed the government to convict executives of a
bank for extending loans to a city treasurer in exchange for
temic corruption,” which includes the “sale of special access to large donors, . . . is
all protected by the First Amendment”).
209 See United States v. Silver, 864 F.3d 102, 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2017).  This is
only one example of how defense counsel has been using McDonnell to challenge
convictions.  “The McDonnell ruling has had a broad ripple effect, with defense
lawyers raising it in corruption cases around the country.”  Benjamin Weiser,
Sheldon Silver’s 2015 Corruption Conviction is Overturned, N.Y. TIMES (July 13,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/13/nyregion/sheldon-silvers-convic
tion-is-overturned.html [https://perma.cc/C77A-KFRZ].
210 Silver, 864 F.3d at 106–09.
211 Id. at 109–10.
212 Id. at 118.
213 See, e.g., United States v. Boyland, 862 F.3d 279, 290–92 (2d Cir. 2017)
(holding that although the jury instructions were erroneous under McDonnell, the
alleged schemes necessarily involved exercise of governmental power and, there-
fore, reversal was inappropriate); United States v. Malkus, No. 12-56499, 2017
WL 3531422 (9th Cir. Aug. 17, 2017) (summarily finding evidence of an official
act).
214 United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 282 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting United
States v. Jennings, 160 F.3d 1006, 1014 (4th Cir. 1998)).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-2\CRN205.txt unknown Seq: 32 15-JAN-18 14:07
496 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 103:465
“get[ting] special treatment.”215  Although the evidence against
these executives showed only that they extended loans and
received the treasurer’s gratitude in return, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the executives’ convic-
tion under the stream of benefits doctrine.216  How is the spe-
cial treatment the Kemp executives received different from the
special treatment Governor McDonnell gave to Williams?217
The Kemp executives could very well have sought to curry favor
and purchase access, which is not illegal.  The stream of bene-
fits doctrine can thus turn gifts in exchange for gratitude into
quid pro quo corruption.218
The stream of benefits doctrine is frequently challenged as
incompatible with other Supreme Court holdings.  Prior to Mc-
Donnell, some individuals have unsuccessfully argued that the
Supreme Court in Skilling v. United States rejects this doc-
trine.219  Although Skilling has failed to undermine the stream
of benefits doctrine, McDonnell may succeed in doing so:
The first hint that the stream of benefits theory may no longer
be viable is the [McDonnell] Court’s requirement of specificity:
an “official act” must “be something specific and focused that
is ‘pending’ or ‘may by law be brought’ before a public offi-
cial.” The next clue is that while Skilling favorably cited cases
that endorsed a stream of benefits theory . . . those citations
are conspicuously absent from McDonnell.  Instead, . . . the
Court in McDonnell qualified the quid pro quo requirement as
follows: it “need not be explicit, and the public official need
not specify the means that he will use to perform his end of
the bargain.” . . .  Thus, although “the means” need not be
specified, it appears that “an” official act must be
specified.220
Unfortunately, “McDonnell did not squarely address this issue,”
and considering “the broad acceptance of the stream of benefits
formulation,” some Courts of Appeals may not abandon the
doctrine despite McDonnell.221  Thus, while the First Amend-
215 Id. at 268.
216 Id. at 266–69, 282.
217 Compare Kemp, 500 F.3d at 266–69, with McDonnell v. United States, 136
S. Ct. 2355, 2362–64 (2016).
218 See, e.g., United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134, 147 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting
that the opposite reading “would legalize some of the most pervasive and en-
trenched corruption, and cannot be what Congress intended”).
219 See Brown, Applying Citizens United, supra note 106, at 221. R
220 Silverglate & Quinn-Judge, supra note 80, at 207–08 (footnotes omitted). R
221 Id. at 207, 208.  Although no court has yet to address the issue, the District
Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania continues to cite Kemp for the
stream of benefits doctrine. See United States v. Williams, Crim. No. 17-137,
2017 WL 2713404, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 13, 2017).
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ment may prove to be a viable shield against certain prosecu-
tions, that shield may be shattered easily in courts that choose
to endorse the stream of benefits doctrine even beyond
McDonnell.
CONCLUSION
On the reading advocated above, McDonnell signals the
existence of a First Amendment right to engage in a corrupt
“pay to play” culture.222  This First Amendment right has the
potential to challenge nearly every U.S. law that addresses cor-
ruption.  Consider, for example, a prosecution for receiving an
illegal gratuity under 18 U.S.C. § 201(c).  Could the defendant
in such a trial not assert that she simply received gifts in return
for ingratiation and access?  Similarly, the First Amendment
challenge could apply to other anti-corruption statutes, such
as those proscribing compensations to members of Con-
gress,223 offers of loans or gratuity to financial institution ex-
aminers,224 bribery of sporting contests,225 and bribery of port
security.226  Interpreted pessimistically, McDonnell might be
the key to dismantling the United States’s anti-corruption
framework.227
What is to be done about the possible First Amendment
right to corruption?  We can elect to do nothing, betting on a
narrow interpretation of McDonnell.  For example, some assert
that the Court in McDonnell simply meant to send federal pros-
ecutors a clear message to “stop overreaching in public corrup-
tion cases.”228  Alternatively, we may assert that lower
tribunals will be reluctant to interpret McDonnell as expan-
sively; they are generally far harsher on corruption than the
222 See supra subpart II.D.
223 See 18 U.S.C. § 203 (2012).
224 See 18 U.S.C. § 212 (2012).
225 See 18 U.S.C. § 224 (2012).
226 See 18 U.S.C. § 226 (2012).
227 Cf. Adam F. Minchew, Note, Who Put the Quo in Quid Pro Quo?: Why Courts
Should Apply McDonnell’s “Official Act” Definition Narrowly, 85 FORDHAM L. REV.
1793, 1818–20 (2017) (discussing how McDonnell could limit prosecutions for
federal funds bribery under 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2012)); see also Brown, Criminaliza-
tion of Politics, supra note 106, at 37 (“McDonnell leads to uncertainty about the R
future of federal anticorruption law.”). But see United States v. Ferriero, 866 F.3d
107, 124–25 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding that, despite McDonnell, the New Jersey
bribery statute was not unconstitutional).
228 Mario Meeks, Once Again, SCOTUS Scolds DOJ for Overreaching, 40 CHAM-
PION 53, 53 (2016); see also Brown, Criminalization of Politics, supra note 106, at R
25–32 (arguing that McDonnell can be read narrowly so as to have little effect on
criminal law).
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Supreme Court.229  District Courts and Courts of Appeals tend
to honor broad judicial discretion Congress bestows, interpret-
ing it as a license to prosecute a broad range of corrupt con-
duct.230  Thus, although the Supreme Court in McDonnell
appeared to condemn prosecutorial and judicial overreach,231
lower tribunals may continue to resist the narrow definition of
corruption—some courts have already distinguished McDonnell
on its facts.232  On the other hand, some lower tribunals may
honor the Supreme Court’s holdings, thus weakening law en-
forcement’s ability to combat corruption.233
If, however, we choose to abolish the First Amendment
right to corruption, then we must reform our entire anti-cor-
ruption framework.  Comprehensive reform is necessary for
numerous reasons.  First, no statute can reverse McDonnell’s
holding—Congress cannot criminalize the giving of something
of value in exchange for influence, favor, and advocacy—be-
cause such statute would likely infringe on the First Amend-
ment.234  Similarly, passing another broad anti-corruption
statute would be futile, as the Supreme Court is bound to limit
it.235  Second, a functioning anti-corruption regime requires
the government to “operate in an accountable and transparent
manner” as well as enforce a comprehensive criminal code.236
Finally, the origin of the First Amendment right to sell influ-
ence, favor, and advocacy lies in Citizens United and McCutch-
eon.  To eliminate this right, it may be necessary “to overturn
the Supreme Court’s troubling narrow quid pro quo definition
of corruption” in the campaign finance setting.237  This could
229 See Brown, Applying Citizens United, supra note 106, at 221 (noting that R
lower tribunals have before resisted attempts at weakening the anti-corruption
framework set up by Kemp).
230 See id. at 222.
231 See Meeks, supra note 228. R
232 See United States v. Boyland, 862 F.3d 279, 290–92 (2d Cir. 2017); United
States v. Jones, 207 F. Supp. 3d 576, 582 (E.D.N.C. 2016).
233 See Silverglate & Quinn-Judge, supra note 80, at 207–08. R
234 See, e.g., S.M., Can Congress Over-ride a Supreme Court Decision?, ECONO-
MIST (July 28, 2015), http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/
2015/07/rights-and-legislation [https://perma.cc/YD3W-LKUH] (quoting
MSNBC host Rachel Maddow).
235 See Brown, Applying Citizens United, supra note 106, at 222. R
236 SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN & BONNIE J. PALIFKA, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT:
CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM 228 (2d ed. 2016).
237 See, e.g., Mikala Noe, Note, McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission
and the Supreme Court’s Narrowed Definition of Corruption, 67 ME. L. REV. 163,
166 (2014).
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be achieved if the Constitution were amended238 or if the Su-
preme Court were to overturn Citizens United.239
For nearly a decade, the Court has protected speech at the
expense of political integrity, which commentators recognized
as hazardous to our democracy.240  Other than scholarly de-
bates, however, action to restore the anti-corruption principles
in campaign financing has stalled.241  Now, the Court threat-
ens Congress’s efforts to criminalize corruption, permitting
those like Governor McDonnell to receive extravagant gifts in
return for zealous advocacy and special treatment.242  While it
remains to be seen whether McDonnell will facilitate the spread
of corruption and sale of public office, one thing is clear: the
Court’s definition of corruption is incompatible with our anti-
corruption laws and principles.  Either the Court must reverse
course or our anti-corruption laws will disappear.
238 See, e.g., S.J. Res. 5, 114th Cong. (2015).
239 See David Cole, How to Reverse Citizens United, ATLANTIC, Apr. 2016, at
13–15.
240 See, e.g., David Gans, Supreme Court Undermining US Constitution, COU-
RIER-J. (Apr. 4, 2014, 4:21 PM), http://www.courier-journal.com/story/opinion/
contributors/2014/04/04/supreme-court-undermining-us-constitution/7315
863/ [https://perma.cc/QQW2-EHXX].
241 See David Edward Burke, The Fight to Overturn Citizens United: What
Happens Now?, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 22, 2016, 11:50 AM), http://www.huffing
tonpost.com/entry/the-fight-to-overturn-citizens-united-what-happens_us_58
346bfde4b08c963e3444fa [http://perma.cc/6MGY-77LU] (discussing the effect
of President Trump’s election).
242 See supra notes 31–44, 209–12 and accompanying text; see also Brown, R
Criminalization of Politics, supra note 106, at 37. R
